DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 071 324 EM 010 469

TITLE	Introduction to Psychology and Leadership. Enrichment VIII; Motivation of Subordinates. Enrichment Modules 15, 16, 17, 18.
INSTITUTION	Naval Academy, Annapolis, Md.; Westinghouse Learning Corp., Annapolis, Md.
SPONS AGENCY	National Center for Educational Research and Development (DHEW/OE), Washington, D.C.
BUREAU NO	BR-8-0448
PUB DATE	May 71
CONTRACT	N00600-68-C-1525
NOTE	52p.; See also EM 010 418 and EM 010 419
EDRS PRICE	MF-$0.65 HC-$3.29
DESCRIPTORS	*Autoinstructional Aids; Communication (Thought Transfer); *Enrichment Activities; Individual Psychology; *Interpersonal Relationship; Leadership; *Leadership Training; *Military Training; Power Structure; Programed Instruction; Psychology; Sequential Programs; Social Psychology

ABSTRACT

Designed to help bring students to greater understanding of concepts of the introduction to psychology and leadership course (see the final reports which summarize the course development project, EM 010 418, EM 010 419, and EM 010 484), this Structural Communications unit is coordinated with the instructional unit in the core course on senior-subordinate relationships (EM 010 437, EM 010 438, EM 010 460, and EM 010 508). The basic strategy of the unit is to have the student work through the central theme which dominates problems presented in a brief series of modules. Each successive module refers to a matrix of statements which the student examines for relevance to the problem being considered. The unit can be used either individually or in a group setting, and was designed so that the end product would be a student with a more complete grasp of the elements of the theme and their interaction. EM 010 420 through EM 010 447 and EM 010 451 through EM 010 512 are related documents. (SH)

Set #3

Contract No. N00600-68 C 1525

ED 071324

UNITED STATES NAVAL ACADEMY

INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHOLOGY AND LEADERSHIP

MAY 1971

ENRICHMENT VIII

THE MOTIVATION OF SUBORDINATES

EM 010 469

Westinghouse Learning Corporation
Annapolis Division
2083 West Street
Annapolis, Maryland 21401

ED 071324

United States Naval Academy

INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHOLOGY AND LEADERSHIP

ENRICHMENT VIII

MOTIVATION OF SUBORDINATES

Enrichment Modules 15, 16, 17, 18

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Annapolis, Maryland

1971

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INSTRUCTIONS

This Structural Communication Unit, "The Motivation of Subordinates," is recommended for use on completion of Part Eight, "Senior Subordinate Relationships" of the course INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHOLOGY AND LEADERSHIP.

The unit commences with an introductory section, which outlines the content of the unit, and the topics to be discussed. The discussion section, itself, is divided into four parts, some of which concern a case study. Each part sets problems to be discussed, with feedback on students' answers to the problems. They all require the use of a Response Indicator, containing a chart of twenty items, which the students use to solve the problems.

INTRODUCTION

The senior officer will have developed the qualities attributed to a good leader through his own personal experience and that of others. His learning is gained not just from implementation of theory and practices recognized as successful, but from trial and error.

In this Unit, you will use a Response Indicator containing items which refer generally to known good leadership practices and characteristics, though they do not indicate specific actions. The items are, of course, relevant to many areas of military activities. But in this Unit you will use them to discuss motivation

To ensure that subordinates are motivated towards their tasks and that objectives are achieved, the leader must inspire confidence in his men and command their obedience. The leader should understand what his subordinates need from him in such areas as guidance, communication, and degree of delegated authority. He must also know how much he can demand of them under varying circumstances in terms of resourcefulness, group cohesion, and cooperation. In modern warfare, efficient planning, preparation, and communication are just as important as the personal qualities of a leader. A leader may have a history of activities performed in a certain pattern. But he should know that there is no one formula for success.

This Unit is divided into four parts. In the first you will consider the items on the Response Indicator as they relate to motivation in general. You will have the opportunity to discuss your selections in relation to your own approach to the problem of motivating men (Module 15). The rest of the unit will be concerned with a real life case study based on General Eichelberger's handling of the Buna Campaign, World War II. In Module 16 you will discuss the problems facing General Eichelberger in taking command at Buna. You will make your own analysis of the situation, and then compare your observations with those of Eichelberger. In Module 17 you will consider the logistics of the situation, that is the efficient planning, provision of supplies, preparation and communication for a military action. When the logistics of a given situation are studied it will be seen why there is no one formula for motivating men. In Module 18 you will have the opportunity to discuss the personal leadership of General Eichelberger in terms of the constraints that the logistics of the situation impose. You will be asked to devise a plan of action based on your observations. You will have the benefit of having assessed General Eichelberger's good and bad practices and qualities.

You will also be able to compare your own plan of action to his, so that you can assess its implementation, and study to what degree General Eichelberger was able to learn from his own immediate experience.

Although it is not necessary to study the Enrichment Modules in numerical sequence, there is some benefit to be gained from working through this Unit in sequence. Modules 16, 17 and 18 are based on the same case study situation and Module 15 generates thoughts on the basic leadership problem addressed in this Unit - Motivation of Subordinates.

However, if a student does proceed with Module 17 or 18 first, it is desirable that the case study situation as depicted in previous modules be read for a more complete orientation.

Turn to page 6 for Module 15
19 for Module 16
27 for Module 17
32 for Module 18

MOTIVATION OF SUBORDINATES

Module Fifteen - Motivation

MODULE 15 - MOTIVATION

The key to the solution to many leadership problems is proper motivation of the individuals being led. When a man has been properly motivated, he will efficiently and willingly perform his assigned tasks. From this motivation develop esprit, enthusiasm, morale, effort, competition, and accomplishment.

Motivation of the American serviceman overseas is best accomplished when he:

1 - Knows why he is there
2 - Is made to feel that he "belongs"
3 - Is performing primarily in a job for which he has been trained.
4 - Knows where his efforts fit into the "big picture"
5 - Is recognized and rewarded for success.

Very few drives of man are stronger than his desire for identification with a group. When he knows that he is wanted that he has a definite niche, a specific job, and that his efforts contribute to the achievement of a common goal, then he becomes proud of himself, his unit, and his superior.

There is a great deal of vanity in each of us, and few things are more motivating than recognition and reward for a job well done. Recognition may be nothing more than a pat on the back, a word of praise and encouragement or a plaudit at a unit formation. It will cost you nothing, but will pay you untold dividends.

These are only a few of the ways to motivate men to do their best. You can add to these by turning to the Response Indicator on page 51 and selecting those items you consider to be suitable activities for motivating subordinates. Select between 5 and 15 items. Record your selection and then proceed to the Discussion Unit on page 8.

Discussion

If your selection includes four or more of the following items: 3, 4, 6, 7, 12, 14, read the paragraphs below.

If it does not, turn to the next page.

Your response shows an emphasis on organizational activities. It is true that these are important for good administrative leadership, but such a leader may be inflexible, and unable to make quick decisions. Merely keeping the machinery running may result in weak interpersonal relations between leader and men, and induce poor motivation.

You should review the items on the Response Indicator, and decide on any changes to your selection.

The factors which contribute to motivation of men are numerous. The leader may, however, have to be selective in a critical situation, and decide on a single approach likely to produce the quickest results. The comments on your response which follow discuss the validity of items for one of three approaches that a leader might take..

APPROACH ONE

IF YOU HAVE INCLUDED FOUR OF ITEMS 2, 5, 9, 17, 19,
GO TO PAGE 9 .

APPROACH TWO

IF YOU HAVE INCLUDED FOUR OF ITEMS 9, 11, 13, 15, 16,
GO TO PAGE 12.

APPROACH THREE

IF YOU HAVE INCLUDED FOUR OF ITEMS 8, 9, 10, 15, 18,
GO TO PAGE 15.

IF NONE OF THESE APPLIES, FOLLOW UP THAT APPROACH WHICH MOST CLOSELY CORRESPONDS WITH YOUR RESPONSE.

Approach One - Communicate with your men

The group of items 2, 5, 9, 17, 19, describe activities which will produce strong motivation through effective communication with your men. You should consider this approach carefully, even if your selection was made according to other criteria.

> If the objectives of a mission are to be clear to the men involved, two things are required. First, the objectives must be stated in terms of the precise results anticipated, so that progress can be evaluated and attainment recognized. Second, plans must be explained in a way that will:
>
> a) orient the men towards the task by emphasizing the importance of the job and reasons for actions and decisions;
>
> b) establish task group identity and solidarity;
>
> c) remove all confusion and uncertainty as to what is required.
>
> When the leader communicates a new objective to his subordinates, he should explain the feasibility of the plan and availability of resources. He should make it clear that all obstacles have been anticipated, in order to preclude doubts on the part of his subordinates. He should have made plans for intermediate goals as well as for the final objective before issuing orders. As he states his intended course of action, he must support it with facts. He must take all precautions to ensure the accuracy of his facts by checking his own and his subordinates' work. This will ensure that his men do not misunderstand their share of the tasks. The subordinates, seeing this thoroughness, will feel confident in the action planned.

The comments which follow analyze your own response and discuss response items on the assumption that communication is the most important factor in motivation.

DISCUSSION COMMENTS - Approach One.

You should read comments appropriate to your selection, and discuss, as a group, their relevance to your own ideas.

A *If you have included two or more of 4, 7, 8, 14, read the following paragraph:*

We assume that by the time you are ready to give orders, you already have a clear idea of what is required of you. We are concerned with how you control the orientation of the men under you towards the work. You should narrow down your response selection of items relevant to the communication problem.

B *If you have included 6 or 10:*

No matter how perceptive a leader is, he cannot foretell every concrete detail affecting maintenance of standards. Clarity of mind is not clairvoyance. The men should be willing to treat the unexpected as a challenge, rather than as an obstacle to attainment of standards. It is questionable whether the leader can train his men to meet such demands by deliberate omission of details from his communication. However, if they know that you yourself are willing to undergo what is demanded of them they should be motivated to meet any reasonable challenge.

C *If you omitted either 11 or 15:*

Your usefulness as an officer lies in your ability to carry out instructions from above. Some of these orders can be fulfilled by those lower than yourself in the chain of command, and you have the authority to pass the orders on. At the same time you have to be able to delegate sufficient authority so that your subordinates can act. Authority then is an essential part of responsiveness to communication. To put it another way, if your subordinates do not have the authority they need to execute orders, their hands will be tied, and there will be a loss of motivation.

D *If you omitted either 6 or 10:*

Communication is rarely only a matter of saying the right words. We can think of three important factors in addition: the first of these is challenge, the second is feedback, and the third is example. Consider the relevance of these things to this approach.

Now turn back to page 8 *if your original selection contained items which would qualify it for analysis according to any of the other approaches. Locate the page to which you should turn for the relevant discussion section.*

If no other approach applied, turn to page 18.

Approach Two - Strengthen your team

The group of items 9, 11, 13, 15, 16, describe activities which will produce strong motivation in subordinates by strengthening them as a team. You should consider this approach carefully, even if your selection was based on other criteria.

> Standards of performance, behavior, and relationships within a group establish the group norm. These standards must be adequate to meet the demands of the task. The good leader must set adequate standards and must direct behavior so that his subordinates are motivated in their jobs. The way in which he does this is by assigning tasks which the men are capable of doing. The tasks should be sufficiently challenging, so that the men have a sense of achievement. Emulation and peer pressure are useful motivational practices here.
>
> The men need sufficient authority to perform the duties assigned, and the leader should be prepared to delegate authority with a minimum of interference thereafter, so that the men are satisfied in their own efforts. The leader must be reliable and have the confidence of his men if he is to establish a norm adequate to the demands of the task. He sets a good example to gain their confidence. The leader must also be able to communicate clearly, so that the group can recognize and accept the required standards.

The comments which follow analyze your own response, and discuss response items on the assumption that communication is the most important factor in motivation.

DISCUSSION COMMENTS - Approach Two.

You should read comments appropriate to your selection, and discuss, as a group, their relevance to your own ideas.

A *If you omitted any of 1, 11, 16, read the following paragraph:*

The leader is ultimately responsible for the actions of his men. However, the men can become involved in their work only when they are allowed to use their own discretion in a concrete and practical way. To develop a real and permanent sense of responsibility in the men, the leader should be able to make them feel responsible for more than mere attainment of objectives according to strictly defined procedures. Their sense of responsibility should be directed towards the all-round maintenance of the group norm. By delegating responsibility, the leader displays trust in his subordinates' capabilities. This, in turn, binds the team as a purposeful group.

B *If you have included two or more of 4, 7, 14, 19:*

You seem to be emphasizing items which refer to planning and organization. Though important, they are not directly relevant for the approach "strengthening the team" in order to motivate subordinates.

C *If you omitted two of 2, 5, 13, 17, 18:*

A very effective means for establishing solidarity among your subordinates is to take them into your confidence. If they feel they have a share in the information available to you, their commitment and sense of participation will be greater. Only blind adulation or archaic, iron discipline will make subordinates do something they find incomprehensible. This does not mean that you have to explain everything. You would probably not have the time. It does mean though that you should give them some idea of the reasons behind the orders.

D *If you included two of 3, 6, 8:*

Your personal capability in handling missions is naturally very important for the motivation of your subordinates and their confidence in your leadership. However, these items do not say anything about the actual manipulation of group norms. A badly organized mission will probably affect motivation. But even when a mission is well handled, organization is no sure indicator of motivation. We are looking for the actions directly affecting group solidarity.

E *If you omitted any of 9, 15, 20:*

An important contribution to the group coherence and motivation of your subordinates is consistency and clarity of direction on your part. If you are weak in this area, you cannot expect your subordinates to share a common sense of purpose. You represent the direct line in the chain of command and authority position, and your involvement with your subordinates should make this apparent at all times.

F *If you included 12:*

The influence of external units and the internal chain of command on group norms is certainly important. Good internal relationships and good external relationships go hand-in-hand. The level at which these relationships are established is important. Subordinates span a number of levels in the chain of command and it is your responsibility to ensure coordination across the various units.

G *If you have omitted 10:*

If subordinates do not see that you, as the leader, attain the required standards, the standards you demand of them have no validity.

Now turn back to page 8 *if your original selection contained items which would qualify it for analysis according to any of the other approaches. Locate the page to which you should turn for the relevant discussion section.*

If no other approach applied, turn to page 18.

Approach Three - Set an example

The group of items 8, 9, 10, 15, 18, describe activities which will produce motivation by the approach, setting a good example. You should consider this approach carefully, even if your selection was made according to other criteria.

> The leader's own behavior and performance are vital factors for the morale and motivation of his subordinates. He must have a clear perception of the tasks ahead and try to anticipate the hazards and obstacles. He should have thought out alternative courses of action. If his subordinates recognize this foresight and resourcefulness, then they will have confidence in his leadership. This confidence is the basis of motivation, as subordinates will be willing participants in the mission. The fact that they are prepared to become involved should not detract from the need for discipline, ongoing planning, checks, and supervision. The subordinates must be aware that the leader is actively attending to all these requirements, so that they feel motivated to do their part with the same diligence and energy.

The comments which follow analyze your response and discuss response items on the assumption that setting an example is the most important factor in motivation.

DISCUSSION COMMENTS - Approach Three.

You should read comments appropriate to your selection, and discuss, as a group, their relevance to your own ideas.

A *If you have omitted either 5 or 9 read the following paragraph:*

Subordinates can have confidence in their leader's judgment and direction only if they see him acting in a rational and consistent manner. The leader should always be definite in his communications, so that there is no cause for doubt. At the same time the men should be aware that the leader has alternatives available, and that any changes are made for good reason. You have omitted at least one item that is essential to motivation.

B *If you included any one of 1, 3, 4, 7, 11, 12, 14:*

We are discussing the effect of direct contact between the leader and his subordinates. Your capabilities as a planner and organizer may not influence their picture of you.

C *If you omitted either 15 or 20:*

These items refer to loyalty and justice which are the essence of personal and professional integrity in the service, and the pattern for good interpersonal relationships.

D *If you omitted any one of 2, 13, 17:*

One of the main sources of your positive image is your personal integrity. Integrity is portrayed by actions and decisions based upon facts and the needs of the situation. Subordinates are motivated when they know they are being fairly treated, and are directed in their work according to objective criteria. Further, by applying these criteria to your own actions and achievements, the men see that your behavior is not colored by a fear of failure or pride.

E *If you included two of 6, 16, 19:*

It is definitely important to make your presence felt, and you are right in assuming that it is good to do this in a positive, vigorous manner.

Now turn back to page 8 if your original selection contained items which would qualify it for analysis according to any of the other approches. Locate the page to which you should turn for the relevant discussion section.

If no other approach applied, turn to the next page.

CONCLUSION

The foundation on which the success of any of the three approaches stands is good organization. The leader must, however, select the approach most likely to produce immediate results, given the needs of the situation. In the long run, the leader may have to shift the emphasis to factors covered by another approach to reinforce the initial improvement in motivation.

You should now turn back to page 8 and study any of the approaches that did not apply to your original selection. It is important that you know what all the approaches entail. If you do not have time to work through the associated discussion comments, you should just read the introductory paragraphs.

MOTIVATION OF SUBORDINATES

Module Sixteen - Taking Command

MODULE 16 - TAKING COMMAND

South Pacific (New Guinea Campaign)
November 1942 *

On November 29, 1942, General Robert Eichelberger, Commanding General of the US I Corps, received orders from General MacArthur at the US High Command Headquarters in Port Moresby, Eastern New Guinea, to relieve General Harding of combat command of the 32nd Division. The 32nd Division was engaged in operations against the Japanese, who were in control of Buna Village. The situation at Buna was very bad. Reports of bad morale had been received. The men were refusing to fight, and were running from the enemy. The situation was all the more critical in view of the impending arrival of Japanese reinforcements.

General Eichelberger was unable to learn much detail from his briefings at headquarters. MacArthur instructed Eichelberger to remove all officers unable or unwilling to fight. If necessary, he was to put sergeants in charge of battalions, and corporals in charge of companies. Quick action was necessary. "Bob," said MacArthur, "I want you to take Buna, or not come back alive. And that goes for your Chief of Staff too!"

PUT YOURSELF IN THE POSITION OF GENERAL EICHELBERGER. REFER TO THE RESPONSE INDICATOR, AND SELECT WHICH ITEMS WOULD BE MOST APPROPRIATE TO THE INITIAL STEPS YOU WOULD TAKE ON ARRIVING AT THE SCENE OF YOUR ASSIGNMENT.

REMEMBER THAT AT THIS POINT YOU HAVE NO EXACT INFORMATION TO GUIDE YOU IN DECIDING ON ANY SPECIFIC APPROACH TO MOTIVATING THE MEN.

WHEN YOU HAVE DECIDED ON A SELECTION, RECORD IT.

THEN TURN TO THE NEXT PAGE.

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* The descriptions contained in this case study are based on the literature concerning the New Guinea Campaign. They contain direct quotes from General Eichelberger's writings, reports of statements by his officers, and I Corps and the Department of Army History records.

DISCUSSION

IN THE COMMENTS WHICH FOLLOW, ALL 20 RESPONSE ITEMS ARE DISCUSSED. THEY HAVE BEEN CATEGORIZED AS FOLLOWS: IMPOSSIBLE, IRRELEVANT, KEY, USEFUL, AND POSSIBLE STEPS FOR INITIAL ACTION IN THE SITUATION GENERAL EICHELBERGER HAS TO DEAL WITH.

YOU SHOULD COMPARE THE COMMENTS WITH YOUR RESPONSE.

Impossible: 2, 7, 8, 11, 20

2, 7, 8 At this early stage of dealing with the situation it is impossible for you to give out comprehensive orders. You do not know enough. This applies to your own planning work. You cannot start up a new program without an understanding of the difficulties of the 32nd Division, and what is needed to overcome them.

11 It may be necessary to change key subordinates. You do not know whether they are capable of supporting you in getting things squared away or who is to be relied upon.

20 You have no data on which you can base disciplinary action. Hasty decisions could be disastrous.

Key: 13, 14, 19

Coming from Headquarters, you are initially in the dark, and you have to find out what has been going on. There is great confusion which is likely to increase, given the rumors of impending Japanese reinforcements. Under these conditions, you cannot rely on the efficiency of the chain of command, and must deal directly with subordinates on many levels. Checking is, therefore, of prime importance, so that you can verify the extent to which the communication channels can be trusted. You must reestablish a firm organizational base.

Useful: 3, 12

These really concern your intentions. Clearly, one of your main concerns will be with logistics in food, arms, equipment. But 3 and 12 have to follow 14.

Possible: 4, 5, 9, 10

4 You could plan a number of alternative approaches before getting involved with the actual complexities of the situation. It very much depends on your temperament whether you can sort out a situation with some preliminary sketch plan, or whether you need to approach the problem with a completely open mind.

5 You have to make an appeal to your men. You must give them a reasoned explanation of your intentions. You should, however, be careful in presenting your reasons. You may feel disappointed and angered by their performance, but if you show this too strongly, you may lose the initial control you have as a newcomer, disassociated from the emotions of the scene.

9, 10 You will have to establish yourself as the new leader, and give the impression that you are determined, and capable of making a success of the mission.

Any of the approaches must take second place in the actions you take to reestablish some kind of order.

Irrelevant: 1, 6, 15, 16, 17, 18

1, 15 It is true that these items are intrinsic responsibilities in the role of Commander, and are assumed automatically when taking on the assignment. But they were intrinsic responsibilities of your predecessor. These items are irrelevant to the dynamics that must be set in motion to improve the immediate situation.

16 There is no basis yet for showing confidence in subordinates, who have so far shown themselves patently incapable of accomplishing the task.

6, 17, 18 These are always sound practices, but so far you do not have enough information to implement them.

THE FOLLOWING IS A BRIEF ACCOUNT OF GENERAL EICHELBERGER'S ACTIVITIES AND FINDINGS ON ARRIVAL AT BUNA. YOU SHOULD STUDY IT. AS YOU READ IT, MAKE A NOTE ON SCRATCH PAPER OF THE NUMBER OF RESPONSE ITEMS RELEVANT TO HIS ACTIVITIES. YOU WILL THEN BE ABLE TO APPLY THE CRITERIA WHICH WERE USED IN THE DISCUSSION SECTION YOU HAVE JUST STUDIED, TO ANALYZE AND EVALUATE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF HIS ACTIVITIES. WHEN YOU HAVE FINISHED READING, YOU SHOULD EXAMINE, YOUR ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION.

General Eichelberger spent his first day at Buna in conference with the 1st Division officers. He obtained a mixture of information, much of it incorrect. "Too many of the officers," he wrote, "who reported to me, had never been up front with the doughboys."

Subsequently, he attended to Corps inspection, accompanied by senior officers, including General Harding. The inspection parties experienced some of the problems of land communication with the fronts. On their way to the Urbana front, for example, they were able to go only a short way by jeep, and had to continue on foot to their destination. At the Urbana Force aid station General Eichelberger encountered a number of unwounded men, sent to the rear to recover from exhaustion or fever. Some had cracked up in combat. He questioned these and others he met further on, and was told they had been sent back for a rest. His reports on what he found contained some judgments made hastily, and based on incomplete information. Though he learned later what the men already knew--that wet jungle wood raised dense columns of smoke, he was extremely indignant, it was reported, that the men at the front were not allowed to cook some captured Japanese rice. He interpreted this reluctance to draw enemy fire as a lack of aggressiveness. It was said that he formed a view--which he later retracted--that the whole division was nothing but a bunch of cowards.

At the front he learned that some of the troops had been repelled by enemy fire along a trail a few hours previous to his inspection. They were still lying low. The only man who was spurred to go out to scout, when Eichelberger offered a decoration to any volunteer, was his own aide.

Everything he observed led to an angry scene later at the Colonel's command post. The General even went so far as to express disbelief that the troops had actually fought. "You're licked," he is reported to have said. The Colonel himself flared up in defense of the men, and the hardships they had undergone.

General Eichelberger's aides reported similar incidents. Colonel Rogers, I Corps Intelligence Officer, described the unkempt appearance of the men, their shortage of rations, and lack of discipline and military courtesy. He visited a regimental combat team to observe what was supposed to be an attack. The regimental post was 4 1/2 miles behind the enemy front line, and the regimental commander and staff rarely left this location. The troops were scattered, eating and sleeping, when they were supposed to be in attack. Rogers' report turned out to be not entirely accurate. For instance, the command post was in fact close to a vital Japanese position at Cape Endaiadere.

Records available at the Department of Army History report that in fact the Japanese were resting up after their sally, and the American troops were likewise digging in and bringing up supplies in preparation for the next day's attack. It was recorded that Colonel Martin, another of the General's aides, admitted "in the light of subsequent knowledge that even with a more daring and vigorous American action, success was unlikely, under prevailing conditions."

The gravity of the situation and the problems that had to be solved are best summed up in Eichelberger's own words:

"Many junior officers seem to have little contact with the men under their command. The troops are disinclined to close with the enemy, having lost half of their strength in three weeks without denting the Japanese perimeter.

"The officers of all levels that you talk to take the men's part and seem to feel nothing more could be hoped for without more supplies and more men; you are told no tanks can function in the swamp, half of the support artillery was lost before reaching the front and one of the Divisions Regiments had to be diverted to help the Australians' offensive to the west of Buna.

"No one in the Division has been, apparently, adequately trained for jungle warfare; the troops don't know how to take advantage of the tactical resources of the jungle and, without accurate maps of any sort, are unable to patrol. Supplying the Division is hazardous and difficult; the same jungle conditions make organizational integrity extremely difficult to maintain and the chain of command is not able to function effectively with units frequently cut off from one another."

MOTIVATION OF SUBORDINATES

Module Seventeen - Logistics

MODULE 17 - LOGISTICS

The logistics of the situation as described on pages 24, 25, 26 also need attention--that is, the planning, organization and distribution of equipment and supplies, and the associated organization and deployment of men. The following module has two parts--first a discussion of logistics in general; second, a discussion of the logistics relevant to the situation at Buna.

Part 1.

Look at the Response Indicator and choose no more than 9 items which you think are most closely linked to logistics.

RECORD YOUR SELECTION.

Then check your individual selection against the Interpretation on the next page.

Discussion

The following interpretation argues for the relevance of items 3, 4, 8, 11, 12, 14, 18 and 19 to the problem of logistics. Reasons are given pertaining to specific groups of these items.

Items 3, 4, 14, 19:

Logistics planning must aim at effectiveness first and economy second. The risk of failure because of inadequate support must be reduced to an acceptable minimum. Intelligent forecasting of contingencies is therefore essential. The requirement of economy in men, time, and materials calls for an independent check on the basic calculations. The information available at each stage is likely to be inadequate, and the leader must know how to supplement it accurately where possible.

Items 8, 12, 19:

Good timing is essential to logistic planning. When dealing with people it is often difficult to predict every factor in an operation, and accordingly abide by a precise timetable such as in the launching of a rocket. A good leader should have sound judgment of people, as well as being a good planner. He must take account of environmental details of the operation, as well as the broader command context of his mission.

Items 12, 14:

Logistics requires reliable and up-to-date information, and good liaison with sources of supply and other units and individuals.

Item 11:

Logistics involves planning subordinates' access to resources. In many instances, detailed supervision is undesirable and subordinates require specific authorization for obtaining necessary materials. Where initiative is allowed, subordinates require authority commensurate with the responsibility assigned them.

Items 4, 18:

Maximized flexibility and minimized risk of failure in case of unforeseen contingencies is necessary in logistics planning. The leader must, therefore, have alternative plans ready, and maintain close contact with the support needs of those under his command in case changes are needed. His subordinates must feel confident that he will be available to help them with any logistic difficulty beyond their own resources.

PART 2

NOW, DECIDE ON JUST 5 ITEMS THAT ARE CRITICAL FOR THE LOGISTICS IN THE BUNA SITUATION.

RECORD THE NUMBERS OF YOUR SELECTION. THEN READ THE FINAL COMMENT AND CONCLUSION.

Final Comment

Consideration of the needs for materials and support brings planning down to earth, as it forces the leader to anticipate any difficulties and doubts facing his subordinates. In the interest of both economy and motivation, tasks must be planned according to the availability of material and support. The leader has to specify in advance what materials are needed, and also be able to procure materials at short notice. Once the mission is under way, he must be ready with alternative plans, and be able to advise and aid subordinates in the actual work area.

CONCLUSION

This section on logistics was necessary to give you an idea of the realities of the situation at Buna. If one is to discuss measures for bringing the 32nd Division back into effective operation, logistics must be properly weighted.

The logistics of the situation are critical. But the Division's failure to use the terrain and grapple with the enemy is more a failure of motivation than anything else. Exhortation or threat is not going to help. The situation must be changed by effective leadership.

MOTIVATION OF SUBORDINATES

Module Eighteen - Leadership

MODULE 18 - LEADERSHIP

In Module 15, three approaches to motivation of subordinates were discussed. In Module 16, the initial steps that a leader might take on arriving at the scene of a problem situation were discussed. Module 17 discussed General Eichelberger's activities and assessment of the situation of Buna. The account stated that he was, at a later stage, able to recognize his own mistakes, as an experienced leader should.

PUT YOURSELF IN THE POSITION OF GENERAL EICHELBERGER, AS DESCRIBED ON PAGES 20,24,25,26. OUTLINE THE ACTIONS YOU WOULD CONSIDER EFFECTIVE IN IMPROVING THE SITUATION AT BUNA. BEAR IN MIND, THE SITUATION AS HE FOUND IT, AND ANY CONSEQUENCES OF HIS AND HIS AIDES" BEHAVIOR AFTER ARRIVAL.

DO NOT AT THIS STAGE REFER TO THE RESPONSE INDICATOR. WHEN YOU ARE CLEAR ON AN OUTLINE FOR AN EFFECTIVE PLAN OF ACTION, RECORD IT. YOU MAY REFER BACK TO PREVIOUS MODULES, IF YOU DESIRE TO REVIEW OTHER ASPECTS OF THIS SITUATION WHILE DOING THIS PROBLEM.

THEN TURN TO THE NEXT PAGE.

THE FOLLOWING IS A REMINDER OF THE THREE APPROACHES TO MOTIVATION SET IN CONTEXT AT BUNA. IDENTIFY THE TWO APPROACHES MOST CLOSELY ALIGNED WITH YOUR PLAN OF ACTION. THEN TURN TO THE RESPONSE INDICATOR, AND MAKE A SELECTION OF ITEMS WHICH DESCRIBE THESE TWO APPROACHES. RECORD YOUR SELECTION. WHEN YOU HAVE FINISHED, TURN TO THE PAGE INDICATED AFTER EACH APPROACH, BELOW, AND WORK THROUGH THE ASSOCIATED DISCUSSION COMMENTS. YOU MAY FIND THAT THE TWO APPROACHES MAKE CONTRADICTORY COMMENTS ON CERTAIN RESPONSE ITEMS. THE PURPOSE OF THIS EXERCISE IS TO GIVE YOU THE OPPORTUNITY TO EVALUATE THE PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE APPROACHES IN THE SITUATION AT BUNA, AS A BASIS FOR IMPLEMENTING A PLAN OF ACTION.

Approach One - Communicate with your men

On your arrival there was an obvious communication gap between officers--from divisional and regimental officers, down to the junior officers and the men. This meant that the troops were not adequately informed of objectives--evident in the confusion at the front.

Imparting and clarifying these objectives to your subordinates could well have a positive effect on the outcome of the mission.

Go to page 36 for Discussion Comments.

Approach Two - Strengthen your team

At Buna, Divisional group identity and norms have apparently deteriorated, resulting in disorganized and ineffective activity. One way to reestablish the Division as a properly functioning fighting unit would be to reestablish group norms and group identity.

Go to page 39 for Discussion Comments.

Approach Three - Set an example

Your preliminary briefing and observations revealed that the officers at Buna were obviously not fulfilling their responsibilities. They had also not established appropriate images of themselves as officers in the eyes of their subordinates. You would probably do a great deal to improve the situation by conveying an appropriate image of yourself as Commanding Officer to the rest of the Division.

Go to page 41 for Discussion Comments.

DISCUSSION COMMENTS - Approach One

YOU SHOULD READ COMMENTS APPROPRIATE TO YOUR SELECTION, AND ANALYZE THEIR RELEVANCE TO YOUR OWN IDEAS.

A *If you have omitted any one of 2, 5, 18 read the following paragraph:*

You may have overlooked the perspective of the approach which these items represent. They describe activities which are an ideal foundation for the effective communication of objectives. They imply three important leadership qualities--impartiality, reasonableness, and objectivity.

The first denotes freedom from bias of personal interests. The second denotes the ability to relate information to the conditions of the situation as well as the demands of the task on an ongoing basis. The third denotes a concern for verifiable facts as the basis for orders. The more your subordinates see the rationale of what you ask, and that their capabilities have been taken into account, the more willing they will be to fight.

B IF YOU HAVE INCLUDED TWO OF 2, 5, AND 9:

The situation at Buna demanded a much greater share out of information to motivate the men. However, the threat of Japanese reinforcements limits the detail you can go into in your communications. When the morale of a unit is good, a leader can reveal more to his men, without spending time on justifying orders and plans. But in this situation, the men are too unsure of themselves and their officers. Orders will have to be issued in a manner acceptable to these men, and be executed promptly. The Commander will probably only have the time to inform his immediate subordinates of the details of his plans and orders. They, in turn, will be similarly constrained by the urgency of the situation.

C *If you have omitted any one of 17, 18, 19:*

These items refer to activities that are essential if verifiable information is to be obtained. The men at the front have to know what they are to do, how to do it, and what to do if something goes wrong. The Commander of this operation must give special attention to these activities, given the poor performance of the men so far. If he has verified information, he can map out the operation, communicate, check and evaluate effectively.

D *If you have included both 6 and 11:*

You should consider the delegation of authority in relation to how you yourself keep in touch with the action. You cannot assign responsibility, and at the same time breathe down the necks of your subordinates. Nor can you carry the weight of the Division entirely on your shoulders. Obviously some checking must be done for control, but you should take care not to destroy initiative--the mainstay of jungle warfare.

E *If you omitted either 6 or 9:*

The right balance of effective supervision and individual initiative will change as action proceeds. The close supervision that is required at the outset may not be necessary as progress is made. Your subordinates must realize not only that their performance will be checked at critical points in the operation, but also that you will evaluate their performance as a whole, upon completion of the mission. If you make this clear to your subordinates, you will maintain a high degree of motivation and strict attention to your communications and orders.

F *If you have included both 10 and 19:*

However confident you are of your own effectiveness as a leader, as head of an efficient communication and control system, you must always be open to upward communication from your subordinates. It is rarely any man, by himself, can assess accurately his own contribution. He should also be aware of changes in a situation that may require him to change his behavior.

G *If you omitted any one of 9, 11, 20:*

If orders are given with an indication of possible reward or punishment, the men will certainly pay more attention to the communication. Indication of reward and punishment will also emphasize the importance of certain objectives. But the contingencies of reward and punishment will become really effective only when the action gets under way, and the men see whether they are heading towards success or failure.

CONCLUSION

In order to rally the men under your command at Buna, you should be able to explain the situation and issue your orders in such a way that (a) the men feel they are capable of surmounting the obstacles, and (b) the elements in the situation that had produced confusion and disorganization can be brought under control. You will effectively motivate your troops by communicating the objectives clearly, and relating them to the actual course of events. They will gain confidence from knowing that you are aware of the realities of the situation, that you are introducing a strong element of organization, and that you are a reliable source of guidance and stable orientation.

DISCUSSION COMMENTS - Approach Two.

YOU SHOULD READ COMMENTS APPROPRIATE TO YOUR SELECTION, AND ANALYZE THEIR RELEVANCE TO YOUR OWN IDEAS.

A *If you omitted either 1 or 15 read the following paragraph:*

You are the link between the Division and the American High Command. You are answerable to the US High Command and also responsible for your subordinates' well-being. If you show that you actively support the policies of your superiors and are also concerned with your subordinates' interests and needs, you can get your men to pull together as a team, and thereby strengthen the chain of command.

B *If you included either 6 or 18:*

Your active supervision is a powerful incentive to good performance. The division, however, must be allowed a certain degree of freedom, so that the men develop a sense of responsibility for adhering to high standards. Obviously, you cannot be everywhere, and should be able to rely on the group norm. You should therefore be perceptive of the need for supervision only where necessary, and the advice and criticism you give should be impartial and constructive, rather than in the nature of a "nursemaid."

C *If you omitted any one of 8, 11, 16:*

To give your subordinates a sense of responsibility towards the mission, both "formal" and "informal" actions on your part are necessary. The "formal" action is to delegate the appropriate authority when it is needed. This is especially important in the case of your chief subordinates, whose authority you might tend to override. The corresponding "informal" action is to display confidence in their abilities. It is possible that neither of these actions by itself will establish group norms within the Division. Scheduling and coordination with the accompanying chain of delegation is, however, a critical component of group coherence. The phrase in item 8, "After consideration of all important factors," therefore, takes on a special significance.

D *If you included 10:*

Setting a personal example is especially significant in battlefield situations. As Corps Commander at Buna, your personal presence at front line attacks will motivate men at all levels to set an example to their peers. Your personal example has, therefore, a direct effect on reactivating the mechanisms of peer pressure--so essential to the operation of group norms.

E *If you omitted any one of 2, 5, 17:*

Explanation of and specific information on objectives plays an important part in establishing Divisional norms. If subordinates can see how the various actions they are involved in fit together, then they can promote the coordination to a high degree by themselves. If information is lacking, you will be forced to exercise more specific control which will weaken group identity.

F *If you omitted either 13 or 20:*

Any favoritism or prejudice on your part will tend to disrupt the group's identity. Excessive disciplinary action could result in the men's uniting against you. Partiality could turn the Division into factions, disrupting cooperation between various units.

CONCLUSION

The establishment of group norms among your subordinates at Buna involves more practical difficulties than in a smaller scale action. As Corps Commander, you are expected to function largely through your immediate subordinates and the chain of command. This obviously presents a further difficulty, given the weaknesses of the chain of command on Eichelberger's arrival. As Commander in the field, you are expected to take a direct hand in forming positive group norms for every man in your command. Appropriate activity in both spheres is necessary in restoring the Division to its appropriate state as a semi-autonomous, effective, fighting force.

DISCUSSION COMMENTS - Approach Three.

YOU SHOULD READ COMMENTS APPROPRIATE TO YOUR SELECTION, AND ANALYZE THEIR RELEVANCE TO YOUR OWN IDEAS.

A *If you included both 6 and 18, read the following paragraph:*

By setting the Division specific operational targets and ensuring their attainment through an efficient feedback mechanism, and involving yourself in the field action, both as observer and constructive critic, you will have combined two essential features of an effective leader. This combination of external control and personal involvement can only be made to work through your skill in giving advice and help to your men when they need it, without at the same time neglecting the other responsibilities you have as Corps Commander. You have to recognize the objectivity of the requirements of the situation and show your subordinates how you, too, come under their dictates.

B *If you included 2 and omitted either 9 or 20:*

Presentation of information relevant to the assignment always involves practical difficulties. You are the one responsible for making the major decisions. Your subordinates need clear directions and rigorous criteria to govern their behavior. It would be dangerous to present complete information in this situation, as it might lead to further loss of resolve among the men. You will have to strike a balance between the degree you can take them into your confidence and the issuance of clear and definite direction. Before you arrived, they had neither full information nor authoritative direction.

C *If you included either 12 or 15 and omitted any one of 5, 12 and 15:*

In putting yourself across to your subordinates both as a responsible leader and an active follower, you will reinforce the significance of the policies and decisions you communicate to them. You will thereby keep them in touch with the overall picture of the war, as well as reinforcing a sense of the relevance of your subordinates' own actions. This will result in improved motivation and an effective system of coordination between units and personnel. You will obviously have to use different strategies according to the different levels among your subordinates. You should, however, be careful to avoid using your relationship with superiors and other units or personnel to shield yourself.

D *If you included both 16 and 19:*

Your response refers to two actions which have special significance for this situation. The first of these is watchfulness, so that you yourself check the men's performance and verify field reports, conveying a strong impression of your determination. But you also have to show confidence in their ability to successfully achieve the mission, in order to boost morale. To combine the two, you must exercise a great deal of self-discipline.

E *If you included 13 and omitted either 8 or 20:*

Your response refers to the need for impartiality towards your subordinates. The point of this impartiality is twofold. On the one hand you have to administer any disciplinary actions or rewards necessary to get the operation on a proper footing again. On the other hand, you are responsible for decisions involving the actual combat operations being carried out. You must give subordinates the assurance that your orders and actions are dictated solely by the needs of the situation and not by your personal likes or dislikes. You should be able to show "a sense of timing." Eichelberger made the initial mistake of offering a reward at an inappropriate time, but this does not preclude rectification of the error.

CONCLUSION

The example you set the Division is important for the success of the mission. Your actions must show the men that you are aware and capable of dealing with the requirements of the situation. If your subordinates are to perform adequately, they will require you to be the source of a renewed sense of confidence and of a pattern of actions within which they can function effectively.

APPENDIX

You have been asked to think about the principles involved in dealing with the problems of an actual situation. Principles have to be reinterpreted for nearly every concrete situation, as they always contain their own unique problems. It is not possible to develop as a leader by following the book of rules alone, nor by applying a single formula to every situation.

Consider how the following quotation drawn from the "Armed Forces Officer" compares to General Eichelberger's actions:

> It is a mistake for an officer, on taking a new post, to order sweeping changes affecting other men, in the belief that this will give him a reputation for action and firmness.
>
> General Curtis E. LeMay, taking over the 21st Bomber Command in the Marianas, faced the worried staff officers of his predecessor and said quietly, "You're all staying put. I assume you know your jobs or you wouldn't be here."

There are two mutually significant characteristics in the motivation of subordinates. First, the leader must wholeheartedly accept the responsibility of his mission, be determined to succeed and be confident of success. Second, he must transmit his determination to his subordinates, so that they become equally committed to an action that goes beyond their immediate experience of fear and hope, boredom and enthusiasm, and what can be perceived of the scene of operations.

Listed on page 45 is a summary of what General Robert L. Eichelberger actually did.

Compare your list with the list below. It is a summary of what General Robert L. Eichelberger actually did.

1. Replaced Division and Regimental Commanders with officers whose abilities he trusted.

2. Went to the front lines on numerous occasions and even led men towards the enemy front, setting an example.

3. Ordered troops to intensify patrolling by night and day to obtain information on the enemy front.

4. Instituted stringent regulations for the maintenance of a "Straggler" line close to the front, behind which none but the wounded and supervised carriers were to be permitted.

5. Improved the supplies of his troops.

6. Issued stringent orders about the use of trees and other natural advantages of terrain.

7. Issued vigorous orders concerning the manner in which he expected his troops to close with the enemy.

8. Ordered his troops to begin cooking food.

The following extracts give a detailed description of the plan of action implemented to rescue the critical situation at Buna.

(1) "Reorganization began at once. Brigadier General Albert W. Waldron, artillery officer of the 32nd, succeeded General Harding as division commander. I replaced some ranking officers. There is a legend that corps officers sleep between sheets in the rear areas while field officers sleep on the ground. It didn't happen that way at Buna. Several of my corps officers quickly assumed combat commands. Even one of my aides was soon leading troops. I am sure no lieutenant general ever had a smaller personal staff. Toward the end, because of illness and wounds, it seemed that my staff might be reduced to Sergeant Clyde Shuck, my secretary, and Sergeant Thaddeus Dombrowski, my orderly. There was no time at Buna for protocol.

It was obvious that there was need of personal leadership. Two members of my staff, Colonel John E. Grose, I Corps inspector general, and Colonel Martin, my operations officer, had had combat experience as ~~infan~~-trymen in World War I. I placed Grose in command of Urbana Force on the left, which was committed to the capture of Buna Village and Buna Mission. Martin took command of Warren Force on the right, which had one flank on the sea.

(2) "I went to the Urbana front with a party consisting of, among others, General Waldron, Colonel De Graaf, Colonel Rogers, and Captain Daniel K. Edwards, my senior aide. Edwards, a North Carolina boy, had been with me for a considerable time and my regard for him was akin to that of father for son. Rogers and Edwards had already distinguished themselves a day or so before. Rogers, unable to recruit volunteers for a patrol, had snaked his way through five-foot, knife-bladed kunai grass to discover that the Old Strip, the original Jap airfield, was comparatively undefended. Edwards had crawled forward to look into Buna Village, and he had brought back out first concrete information about enemy positions there.

I watched the advance from the forward regimental command post, which was about a hundred and twenty-five yards from Buna Village. The troops moved forward a few yards, heard the typewriter clatter of Jap machine guns, ducked down, and stayed down. My little group and I left the observation post and moved through one company that was bogged down.

I spoke to the troops as we walked along. "Lads, come along with us." And they did. In the same fashion we were able to lead several units against the bunkers at Buna Village. There is an ancient military maxim that a commander must be seen by his troops in combat. When I arrived at Buna there was a rule against officers wearing insignia of rank at the front because this might draw enemy fire. I was glad on the particular day that there were three stars on my collar which glittered in the sun. How else would those sick and cast-down soldiers have known their commander was in there with them? They knew, being sensible men, that a bullet is no respecter of rank. As I wrote to General Sutherland that evening: "The number of our troops who tried to avoid combat today could be numbered on your fingers."

(3) *Under I Corps, corrective measures were immediately taken to increase the aggressiveness of the American force. One example of the new attitude is illustrated by this paragraph in I Corps Intelligence Instruction No. 1, dated 3 December 1942:*

"Patrolling will be intensified by night and by day to obtain information as to strength, composition and dispositions of enemy of your front."

(4) "No personnel except those tagged for evacuation or seriously wounded and carrying parties under officer supervision will be permitted in rear of the straggler line."

(5) "Two things were imperatively necessary: reorganization of the troops and immediate improvement of supply. The latter assignment I placed on the capable shoulders of Colonel George De Graaf, I Corps supply officer, who throughout the rest of the campaign performed prodigious and sometimes ruthless feats of magic to bring in food and medicine and clothing by air and sea."

(6) " The advance of our foot elements will be covered by our snipers located in trees and all trees will be sprayed with rifle and automatic weapons fire as the attack progresses."

(7) " All ground gained will be held.

All units not in contact will continue constant pressure all along the front prior to the attack." *

(8) "Men in the front lines were half starved and what rations they had they were eating cold. They had been told that the cooking of rice to augment their tinned food would draw the enemy fire. I changed all that. Hot food and warmed stomachs are elemental as morale builders and well worth the hazard of a sniper's bullet. Anyway, our troops were clearly visible to any Japanese who wanted to look at them; it was only the Japanese, high in the trees, low under tree roots, and secure in concealed bunkers, who were invisible to us."

*Paragraph 3x of Field Order 3, 17 December 1942.

CONCLUSION

Not all of General Eichelberger's direct leadership was successful. On December 5th, when the Division launched a major attack on the Japanese forces, the General was determined to have Buna taken:

> "He ordered Company F to pass through Company E and take the village. Colonel Grose immediately protested the order. Instead of committing Company F, his last reserve, to the center of the line, Grose had hoped to use it at a more propitious moment on the left. He told General Eichelberger that there was nothing to be gained by hurrying the attack, that it was the kind of attack that might take "a day or two," but General Eichelberger had apparently set his heart on taking Buna Village that day and overruled his protest."

1st Lt. Robert H. Odell, in charge of half F company, later said:

> "It was intended that we finish the job - actually take the Village - and (it was thought) that we needed little more than our bayonets to do it. Well, off we went, and within a few minutes our rush forward had been definitely and completely halted. Of the 40 men who started with me, 4 had been (known) killed, and 18 were lying wounded. We were within a few yards of the village, but with...no chance of going a step further..."

Buna was not in fact taken until December 14th.

General Eichelberger's story continues:

"We took Buna Village on December 14, and I received a congratulatory message from General MacArthur. The worst of the campaign still lay ahead of us. The prodigious rains continued. Because of the inundation it took miles of winding communications and many stumbling heavy-laden men to get food and ammunition forward. At a place like Buna, figures on "available" riflemen are completely deceptive as to the real strength of the front line. We had virtually no motor transport, and no roads for truck travel anyway. Native bearers flatly refused to go near the front lines. This left us no alternative but to use many of our combat troops as carriers to sustain the rest.

No one could remember when he had been dry. The feet, arms, bellies, chests, armpits of my soldiers were hideous with jungle rot. The sun appeared when the skies wrung themselves out briefly, and the steam rose like gray smoke in the dank undergrowth. Then the soldiers themselves steamed and sweated in their heavy jungle suits. These suits were supposedly porous. Back in Australia, before the New Guinea expedition, it was I who had ordered them dyed a mottled green to aid troop concealment. This was well meant but a serious error. The dye closed the "breathing spaces" in the cloth."

RESPONSE INDICATOR

THE MOTIVATION OF SUBORDINATES

Accept responsibility for the actions of your subordinates. 1	Present complete information. 2	Seek to economize in the use of men and material. 3
Explain the importance of the job or assignment. Give reasons for changes in plans or rules. 5	Set a high standard of accomplishment and provide a system of supervision and checks to see that the standard is adhered to. 6	Set short and long-range goals and make definite plans to reach these goals. 7
Give orders or directions in an authoritative and consistent manner. 9	Set an example of good behavior and performance. 10	Assign specific tasks to subordinates, and delegate to them the necessary authority to carry them out. 11
Consider facts - rather than personal prejudice or experience - in decisions and actions involving subordinates. 13	Seek out sources of information to instruct yourself. 14	Always support the policies and actions of superiors and associates. 15
Substantiate suggested courses of action with facts. 17	Offer constructive suggestions for improvement of work, show interest in subordinates' work, discuss problem areas, and check progress periodically or at crucial points. 18	Check on the adequacy of your own and others' performance or information. 19

RESPONSE INDICATOR

THE MOTIVATION OF SUBORDINATES

ponsibility ions of inates. 1	Present complete information. 2	Seek to economize in the use of men and material. 3	Plan detailed aspects of procedures necessary to accomplish the assignment. Consider various alternative approaches and their probable consequences. 4
e importance or assign- ns for plans or 5	Set a high standard of accomplishment and provide a system of supervision and checks to see that the standard is adhered to. 6	Set short and long-range goals and make definite plans to reach these goals. 7	Schedule work, and allocate your own time and that of your personnel after consideration of all important factors. 8
s or in an ive and manner. 9	Set an example of good behavior and performance. 10	Assign specific tasks to subordinates, and delegate to them the necessary authority to carry them out. 11	Co-ordinate appropriate units and personnel. 12
acts - n personal or experi- decisions s involving es. 13	Seek out sources of information to instruct yourself. 14	Always support the policies and actions of superiors and associates. 15	Display confidence in the ability of your subordinates to accomplish the task. 16
te suggested action with 17	Offer constructive suggestions for improvement of work, show interest in subordinates' work, discuss problem areas, and check progress periodically or at crucial points. 18	Check on the adequacy of your own and others' performance or information. 19	Administer disciplinary action and rewards in a timely and appropriate manner. 20